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Introduction 
The North Korea proliferation problem is one of the two most dangerous flashpoints in East Asia 
today.[1] It involves many complex issues: the legacy of Cold War divisions; nationalism in 
Northeast Asia; Sino-American rivalry for leadership and allies; proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (both within the region and beyond); and finally, humanitarian tragedy. This article will 
evaluate one important issue among these interrelated issues is the role of the Sino-American 
relationship to the North Korea issue. It will do so by carefully evaluating Chinese policy toward 
North Korea and then considering the implications for the United States. It will argue that Chinese 
policy toward the North Korea proliferation issue is best understood as one manifestation of its 
overall policy toward East Asia. Beyond that, from a U.S. perspective, this policy has been much 
more positive than is commonly assumed.  
The article will proceed by first characterizing Chinese interests in North Korea, both today and 
historically. Next, the Chinese-Korean relationship will be put in the context of the broader shifts 
in Chinese foreign policy in the past decade. Finally, the specific Chinese policies toward North 
Korea in the past several years will be surveyed, highlighting the numerous, albeit small, steps 
China has taken to check or slow North Korean proliferation. This will allow China’s overall policy 
goals in this case to be considered.  
This paper will argue that the Korean proliferation issue is not likely to be “solved.” While Chinese 
and American policy is aligned at a broad level, there is no sign that either nation is willing to go 
to the extreme level that would be required to de-nuclearize North Korea. Chinese concerns 
about regional instability are substantial and will likely prevent the extremely hard forms of 
pressure that would be required to compel Korea to back down.[2] That said, Chinese policy has 
been broadly supportive of U.S. interests. Excessive criticism of China on this issue is misguided 
and counterproductive in the overall relationship between Washington and China. 
Chinese Interests with Regard to North Korea  
When China views North Korea, what interests does it have in mind? This section will focus its 
discussion on the strategic interests that Beijing sources express in both “on the record” and “off 
the record” discussions of the issue. For simplicity’s sake, this paper will generally focus on China 
as a unitary actor. While this is a gross and inaccurate assumption, the point of this paper is not 
to argue the accuracy of that approach, but rather to point out that even this substantial 
simplification leads to a clear understanding of the nature of China’s North Korea policy.[3] 
Chinese Material Interests  
China has a range of interests at stake in the Korean peninsula, stemming from both local and 
regional factors. The most important concern falls in the first category: its own border security. 
Korea has historically served as an invasion corridor between China and Japan, and at a broad, 
long-term level, China remains concerned about the geostrategic advantages that an adversary 
would possess were it to control the peninsula. In this regard, American troops in the northern 
portion of a reunified Korea would be viewed as deeply threatening to Chinese leaders.[4]  
While that geostrategic concern is rather far fetched in the current situation, China has more 
proximate concerns as well. Beijing greatly fears the potential for instability and lower-level 
conflict to spread from North Korea across the border.  
China already faces a substantial problem with refugees from North Korea in its border provinces 
of Jilin and Liaoning. It is estimated that tens of thousands of North Koreans refugees have found 
their way into this region, intermingling with a pre-existing ethnic Korean community. While these 
represent something of an economic burden, and even more a challenge to overburdened law 
and order officials in the region, the fear in Beijing is what might happen in the future. Either in the 
context of an economic collapse or military conflict in North Korea, these numbers could be 
expected to swell substantially. This would greatly exacerbate a problem that already presents 
the leadership in Beijing with grave challenges.[5]  
Related to this problem in the region, there is a steady flow of migrants seeking political asylum in 
third countries that find their way to Beijing’s “Embassy District” where they attempt to sneak onto 
a foreign embassy’s grounds. While this is clearly not a security problem, it does serve as a minor 
irritant that reminds the Beijing leadership about the problems associated with the broader 
migration issue discussed above.  
Beyond these local concerns, Beijing does have broader regional interests in play on this issue. 
Formally, of course, Beijing opposes any nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. China already 
has three nuclear neighbors, not counting North Korea. This is substantially more than any other 
country faces.[6] Any proliferation on the Korean Peninsula would directly complicate China’s 
security environment.  
However, more fundamentally, proliferation in North Korea could well spill over throughout the 
region. Nearly certainly, Japan would further deepen its cooperation with the United States on 
missile defense. This had greatly accelerated following North Korea’s missile test of 1998 and the 
subsequent revelations about the North Korean program in 2002.[7] Indeed, Japanese 
modernization is very closely linked to the North Korean threat in general.[8] Chinese views about 
the Japanese development of missile defense systems have been sharply negative.[9]  
Worse yet, from the Beijing’s perspective, would be the prospect of formal nuclearization of Japan. 
This is an issue that is watched carefully in China.[10] There is some recognition in China that 
proliferation in Korea may well spill over to Japan. For instance, Rear Admiral Yang Yi, the 
director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at China’s National Defense University, writes of his 
concerns:  
It is not just a nuclear armed DPRK, but also the extremely difficult task of dissuading other 
countries from following suit. Some East Asian countries have the potential capability in 
developing nuclear weapons. And others even have available technologies and resources. Many 
international experts hold that Japan and ROK in particular are the most likely countries in East 
Asia that will opt to develop nuclear weapons.[11]  
Such a proliferation spiral would be catastrophic for China, and there is increasing evidence that 
this prospect is widely discussed in Beijing.[12] What is not discussed (openly) is the prospect 
that a proliferation spiral that began in Pyongyang and spread through Seoul and Tokyo might 
end in Taipei. The development of nuclear weapons by Taiwan has long been a formal casus belli 
for the Chinese leadership, thus accounting for its sensitive status in the current debate. However, 
this would be a logical conclusion for analysts viewing the region. Were that to happen, the costs 
to China would be high indeed.  
China then faces two important concerns: stability of the Korean Peninsula and avoiding 
proliferation in the DPRK and beyond. It should be noted that these are also the top two interests 
of the United States. What distinguishes Washington’s preferences from those of Beijing is not 
the nature of the interests, but their prioritization. China is more concerned about stability than 
proliferation, whereas the United States has the opposite ranking.[13] 
Historical Legacies  
Of course, beyond narrow material interests, social and cultural factors affect national 
interests.[14] Historically, North Korea and China have shared bonds stemming from a bloody 
war fought side-by-side and a long-term alliance between the two countries. Further, perhaps 
most important from the long-term perspective, will be the view between the two societies from a 
social perspective. Assessing Chinese popular opinion is always a challenge rife with 
opportunities for error. This is certainly the case with regard to views of North Korea and Kim 
Jong-il. However, we should not neglect the information that is available. Media support for North 
Korea is strong, as shown through the fawning coverage Kim receives on every visit to China. 
While the coverage in the media most closely tied to the propaganda ministries is not particularly 
enlightening, not all media sources are equally dominated by the government and there is an 
emerging diversity of views on many issues in Chinese media.[15] Some chat groups also show 
strong bonds between the two societies.[16] While this is not intended to imply that the two will 
have a close alliance relationship, it does suggest that ties between them are less likely to be 
determined solely by the geopolitical realities that they face. Some close relations should be 
expected.[17]  
Thus, China has many interests in North Korea. For material reasons, the proliferation issue is 
clearly an important one for Beijing. Beyond that, however, material-based concerns regarding 
border stability and the cultural legacies of history will lead Beijing to care about the potential for 
chaos in North Korea. 
Chinese Policy Towards the Region  
Since the late 1990s, China has embarked on a very deliberate policy aimed at improving its 
reputation in the region. Central to this has been Beijing’s rhetorical adherence to the “New 
Security Concept.” This has several important elements that differentiate it from previous 
initiatives in Chinese foreign policy, in particular, from the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence” of the 1950s.[18] Most importantly, it emphasizes the utility of multilateral 
mechanisms to address and even solve security problems. This has been a central element in the 
past decade or so of Chinese foreign policy.[19] (It is ironic that at the very moment that China 
has begun to cooperate more completely with international organizations—long a goal of 
Washington’s diplomacy—the United States has moved away from existing formal institutions.[20])  
This new emphasis in Chinese foreign policy shows up in several areas. At the UN Security 
Council, China has supported resolutions against Iraq under Chapter VII, thus legitimating the 
use of force.[21] More recently, they supported a strong resolution “demanding” that North Korea 
discontinue its missile provocations (although this resolution was notably passed without 
reference to Chapter VII). China has been an avid participant in various ASEAN-spawned 
institutions: the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN-plus-three meetings, and the East Asian 
Summit. These, and the Six-Party Talk process discussed below, are the central security 
institutions in East Asia.[22] China had historically avoided participation in these sorts of 
institutions given concerns that they might be dominated by the United States. Those views have 
declined over time, and China’s participation has risen accordingly.[23]  
Aside from this shift on the issue of multilateralism, Beijing has engaged in a marked shift away 
from confrontational policies with her neighbors. The most notable element of this comes in the 
area of resolution of border disputes. Fravel, in the most comprehensive study to date of this 
aspect of China’s policy, summarizes: “ China has also used peaceful means to manage conflicts, 
settling seventeen of its twenty-three territorial disputes, often with substantial compromises.”[24] 
This is a substantial shift in an area of policy that had previously led to wars over border disputes 
with India (1962), Russia/Soviet Union (1969), and Vietnam (1979 and 1988), as well as a 
number of smaller border conflicts.  
Typical of this shift has been the improvement in the Chinese policy over the South China Sea. 
Long an area of gradual territorial encroachment and aggrandizement,[25] China has now 
pledged not to use military means to take control of any additional territory. It has made this 
pledge through a formal legal document, a “Declaration of Conduct” formally signed between 
China and ASEAN in 2002 and deposited at the UN repository of such international agreements. 
Several points are notable about this. While not as strong a legal document as the “Code of 
Conduct” that several ASEAN states had been holding out for, it does clearly put China’s 
reputation on the line. At the end of the day, it remains a paper commitment that could be torn up 
as the Munich Agreements were by Hitler. Yet, as was the case for Hitler, doing so would be a 
clear marker of aggressive intentions. China has laid out a standard by which its future behavior 
might be judged. This is suggestive of Chinese intentions (although not completely deterministic, 
by any means).  
These shifts in regional policy set the context for the evaluation of Chinese policy toward North 
Korea. They would suggest that China is generally aiming to avoid provocations with many of its 
neighbors,[26] and this shift is consistent with the overall focus on ensuring stability at home and 
abroad to allow for economic development of what remains a third world state. This emphasis on 
stability and creating the impression of a benevolent responsibility is suggestive for analysis of 
China’s North Korea policy in particular. 
Chinese Policy on the North Korean Proliferation Issue  
China has enormous leverage over North Korea. In general, it has not brought its full weight to 
the table with its neighbor. That said, China has taken a large number of small steps that have 
sent consistent signals to the North Koreans that the United States should welcome. This section 
will survey those steps, and then step back to consider to what extent they are consistent with the 
overall policy discussed above. An alternate evaluation of Chinese policy—that it is aimed to use 
the North Korea proliferation issue as a way to balance against American dominance in the 
region—is also considered, but found to be less satisfying. Chinese policy is poorly configured to 
use this issue in a realpolitik manner. Rather, Beijing appears to be trying to carefully balance its 
policy between minimizing both proliferation and instability in its neighborhood. 
The Six-Party Talks Forum  
The Six-Party Talks, bringing together China, Russia, Japan, the United States, and both Koreas 
in a series of meetings over the past three years, are the primary diplomatic forum for addressing 
North Korea’s nuclear proliferation policies. There are two important points about the Six-Party 
Talks that are relevant to this essay.[27] First, they represent precisely the sort of approach that 
the Bush Administration had clamored for in its early years in office. Second, China has been a 
dominant force behind creating and sustaining the talks.  
When the Bush Administration came to office it hoped to move away from what seemed a chronic, 
and unproductive, pattern in North Korean-American negotiations. Inevitably, when negotiations 
foundered or broke down, each side would trade heated accusations at the other, and the United 
States would bear an inappropriately large burden in regional public opinion for the degeneration 
in relations. Rather than allowing the North Koreans to “isolate” the United States in this way, the 
Bush Administration aimed to entangle others in the region in the process of negotiations with the 
North Koreans as well, thus allowing them to better judge the nature of the problem. This also 
would allow for a unified front among like-minded regional players in leaning upon Pyongyang to 
make concessions.  
Many bitterly contested this approach, and indeed, for a while it appeared stymied by the North 
Koreans’ reluctance to participate in anything beyond a bilateral forum. Many criticized the 
Administration for foot-dragging and a reluctance to conduct diplomacy in an area that gravely 
threatened American interests. However, eventually the Bush Administration secured a major 
victory when the major regional players embraced its approach and North Korea was forced to 
come along in the process.  
China was vital to the creation and survival of this process. It hosted the original tri-partite 
meeting between North Korea, China, and the United States that led to the Six-Party process. It 
has repeatedly leaned on North Korea to continue attending the sessions.[28] It is the key 
diplomatic facilitator of the Six-Party Talks. When sessions have bogged down, Chinese 
diplomatic leadership has been crucial to overcoming impediments.[29] Pyongyang has been 
pushed into attending five formal rounds of negotiations and numerous preparatory or working 
group sessions despite its usual practice of avoiding such fora.[30] As Glosserman concludes, 
“The entire Six-Party process is a credit to Chinese diplomacy.[31]  
It is clear that the Six-Party Talks have not “resolved” the North Korean nuclear proliferation 
issue.[32] Nevertheless, the process itself was a goal of the Bush Administration. The failure to 
de-proliferate the Peninsula now comes in the face of a unified regional front aimed at checking 
Pyongyang’s desires rather than narrowly reflecting on the United States. This was the motivation 
behind Washington’s emphasis on this approach, to allow the issue to move beyond the purely 
bilateral setting that had proven problematic in previous iterations of the slow burning crisis. As 
this paper argues later, “solving” the North Korean proliferation problem is not a likely outcome. 
China’s policy on the Six-Party Talks should not be excessively faulted for not achieving an 
outcome that is extremely unlikely in any context. 
Other Coercive Policies  
Beyond implementing the Bush Administration’s main approach to the North Korea problem, 
China has used a number of coercive tools directly against Pyongyang. All of these have been 
relatively low key, but each sends a strong and unmistakable signal to the hermit kingdom. China 
clearly has substantial leverage against the North. Were it ever to exert it in its entirety, the costs 
to North Korea would be tremendous. According to one former Chinese bureaucrat from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China “is believed to account for 80-90 percent of North Korea’s fuel 
and one-third of its food imports.”[33] While China has not brought this full coercive potential to 
bear, it has sent a number of smaller signals.  
Most commonly discussed is the brief shutdown of the only remaining oil pipeline between China 
and North Korea in February, 2003. This is generally viewed as a form of pressure to push the 
then recalcitrant North Koreans to sit down at the original late-April 2003 trilateral meeting.[34] 
Another commonly cited move by the Chinese was the substitution of PLA troops for border 
control forces in mid-2003. Here, the evidence is rather unclear as to whether this was intended 
to send a coercive signal to the North.[35]  
Less ambiguous are a number of small steps that have received little attention in the western 
media. One was the interception of a shipment of chemicals that could have been used in the 
separation process separating weapons grade plutonium.[36] Beijing also publicly called for 
Pyongyang to refrain from testing missiles in mid-2006 and issued a (mild) rebuke on its own 
when the tests were actually conducted.[37] Later it supported the modification of a Japanese 
draft of a UN Security Council condemnation of the test. Finally, Beijing supported the United 
States’ moves against North Korean bank accounts accused of laundering counterfeit currency by 
freezing the accounts in its own sovereign territory of Macao.[38]  
Each of these represents an important coercive signal sent to the leadership in Pyongyang. 
Clearly, none has the same effect as complete set of economic sanctions. However, such 
sanctions would greatly increase the likelihood of political collapse, civil war, and—perhaps—a 
renewal of international hostilities on the Korean peninsula that might bring American troops north 
of the 38th parallel again. These policies are aimed to convey a narrow message to deter 
proliferation, but to do so without substantially raising the prospect of chaos in Beijing’s neighbor. 
A More Malign View of Chinese Policy?  
The policies summarized above are certainly multifaceted. Chinese pressure tactics on North 
Korea could certainly be strengthened, and those tactics are only one part of the overall set of 
policies (that also include policies aimed to support economic reforms in North Korea). How then, 
is one to assess the complete package of policies? Might such moves conceal a desire by Beijing 
to allow this problem to fester, creating problems for American strategic interests in the region 
without raising the ire of Washington more directly?  
Such possibilities are certainly hard to refute, but some of China’s behavior is inconsistent with 
this approach. Were that the strategy, one would expect a number of loudly broadcast 
condemnations of Pyongyang coupled with quiet statements of support in private to North Korean 
leaders.  
For instance, the oil pipeline shut off is an interesting case. Why wouldn’t such a step have been 
taken very publicly to appease the United States? This could have been done at the same time 
that the North Koreans were informed in advance of the looming action, allowing them to take 
steps to stockpile supplies and manage the perceptual costs of the embargo.[39]  
Similarly, charted above were a large number of quiet steps taken by Beijing that, as noted, have 
typically not risen to visibility in the American debate over Chinese behavior. Stopping a plane 
here, and freezing accounts there, these are too small to capture much attention in Washington. 
However, they should send very loud signals to Pyongyang as they strike to the core of 
Washington’s concerns over North Korean proliferation.  
Finally, it is clear that South Korea has come to similar conclusions as Beijing about the viability 
of pressure tactics and the relative costs of them. They, too, are heavily involved in supporting 
North Korean economic reforms and have opposed the most overt tactics aimed at pressuring the 
North. Clearly, they do not have an interest in complicating the American position in the 
region.[40] This congruence of Chinese and South Korean policies with regard to the merits of 
supporting North Korean economic reforms is suggestive that the source of their behavior is not 
global geostrategic interests (which differ substantially between Beijing and Seoul), but very 
locally-based concerns: these two countries would suffer the most in the case of conflict on the 
peninsula. That concern weighs more heavily on both than the proliferation issue generally.  
At a broad level, Chinese policy toward North Korea appears consistent with its overall foreign 
policy in the past decade: a markedly more stabilizing policy aimed at minimizing conflict. China is 
not directly supporting North Korean provocations, and is playing some role in checking such 
moves by Pyongyang. More importantly, it is aiming to create political stability on its periphery.  
One final point on the congruence between Chinese policy and American interests should be 
made explicit. The United States has vacillated at different times over whether it is pursuing 
“regime change” in North Korea. While this has been explicit in the tone of neoconservatives 
outside of the government, more recently the official American position has at least put “security 
guarantees” on the table. Clearly, when this aspect of American policy is at the fore, the gap 
between U.S. and Chinese goals narrows. When regime change is a higher priority, it is indeed 
clear that there is a larger gap between Washington and Beijing. 
Conclusions and Implications  
So where does that leave the North Korean problem? At the end of the day, North Korea 
perceives robust incentives to continue with its nuclear program. It is likely the case that North 
Korea views a wide range of U.S. policies aimed at directly threatening its regime, regardless of 
how those might be perceived in the United States. Given that, nuclear weapons are likely to look 
very attractive to the North. China is unlikely to press hard enough to change that for two reasons: 
first, that is a very high bar given North Korean perceptions; and second, Beijing fears its most 
potent pressure tactics will lead to regime collapse and violence or chaos on the Peninsula. As 
has been the case since 1994 at least, it is clear that Washington too has limits to the costs it is 
willing to bear on this issue as well. Given the current challenges faced in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
such cost-benefit evaluations look even more challenging today.  
What this suggests is that instead of reversing North Korean proliferation through Chinese 
pressure, the goals of American policy makers should be more narrowly focused on amelioration 
of the threat in the short term coupled with moves aimed to support the ongoing reform process in 
North Korea that will eventually integrate it in the region and undermine its xenophobic threat 
perceptions. Specifically, missile defense systems throughout the region should remain a priority. 
Pressure tactics on either China or South Korea regarding their North Korean policies are 
counterproductive. The United States has a long roster of issues that it needs to address with 
both. Pressuring them to do more on the North Korea issue does not serve those interests, and 
indeed pushes South Korea, one of Washington’s historically closest allies in the region, closer to 
Beijing. The Proliferation Security Initiative is another policy area that deserves continued 
attention. It is an area of emerging consensus between Washington and Beijing, and is valuable 
because it helps to reduce the spillover effects of the North Korean proliferation itself.  
However, these areas ought to be the focus rather than what are likely to be ill-fated attempts to 
pressure Beijing into a more hard-line policy. Beijing has a different prioritization of interests than 
does the United States, and nothing in Washington’s policy quiver can change that. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
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